

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

## INFORMATION REPORT

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Empionege Laws, Title 18, U.S.O. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorised person is prohibited by law.

SECRET


SUBJECT Resistance and Unresis  DATE DISTR. 11 January 125X1  NO. OF PAGES 5  DATE OF INTO.  PLACE ACQUIRED  This is UNEVALUATED Information  THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS BEPORT ARE DEFINITIVE. THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.	COUNTRY	Czechoslovakia		REPORT			
DATE OF INFO.  PLACE ACQUIRED  This is UNEVALUATED Information.  THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS BEPORT ARE DEFINITIVE. THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.					11	January 1	25V1
PLACE ACQUIRED  This is UNEVALUATED Information  THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE. THE APPRAISAL OF CONTRAFT IS TENTATIVE.						0 G11 GG1 5 2,	20/1
This is UNEVALUATED Information 25X1  THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE. THE APPRAISAL OF CONTRACT IS TENTATIVE.	DATE OF INFO			The second second			
This is UNEVALUATED Information 25X1  THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE. THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.							
THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE. THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.		This is UNEVALUATE	 D Information			25	5X1
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTINE IS TENTATIVE.							
					- 1		
ika ja kirja sa kirja kirja ika alipa kelin <b>(por revise myene</b> ) atau kalanda kirja ika mana kalanda kirja kirja			AL OF CONTENT IS TENTAL OR REY SEE REVENSE)	TIVE.		the state of	

ARMY review completed.

25X1

25 YEAR RE-REVIEW

SECRET



		SECRET	DEDORT
		SECKET	REPORT
			25X1
COUNTRY	Czechoslovakia		DATE DISTR.26, Nov.1954
SUBJECT	Resistance and Unrest	**************************************	NO. OF PAGES 14
DATE OF INF	ORMATION		25X1 REFERENCES:
PLACE ACQU	JIRED		
			25X1
	THIS IS UNEV	ALUATED INFORMATION	
Possible Tr	nstances		
Possible Ir	nstances no evidence of org however, the followin	anized resistance g	roups in Czecho-

fires on Velky Lopenik Mountain 25X1 in the White Carpatnians near the Moravian-Slovakian border, about 70 km. southwest of Prerov (N 49-27, E 17-27). Others 25X1 who saw the fires assumed they were signals set up by partisan groups for parachutists.

| many persons believed partisan groups were hiding in the Carpathian Mountains

25X1 In the Carpathian area, police established roadblocks at

various times and checked people for documents. Normally, such checks were conducted only in territory along the border. Many considered these checks indirect proof of the existence of partisans.

25X1

\_\_\_SECRET\_.

	SECRET	
	- 2 ··	25X1
Air	ns	25X1
2.	the chief aim of partisan groups was to broadcast to the West and to obtain production figures of Czechoslovak industries.	25X1
	the	25X1
	alm of partisan groups was not of a long-range nature but was confined to the transmission of accurate information to the West	25X1 25X1
Ext	tent of Operations	_
3.	partisan operations were limited and conducte on a small scale by small groups.	
	on a small scale by small groups.	25X1 25X1
Sat	potage Activities	
4.	one incident of sabotage when railroad workers damaged locomotives in order to tie up the railroad yards in Prerov.	25X1
Pro	bable Scope and Success	
5.	The Czechoslovak people thought of the possible success of current resistance operations, without massive external aid, only in terms of small=scale results. They did not expect any major changes or upheavals in government. They apparently believed that only outside help could bring about large-scale results.	25X1
Mem	bership	25X1
6.	no precise data on partisans. most of	
	them were adult males. there were no women partis most partisans were Czechs that had fled to the west at an earlier date and then returned to wage a fight for the eventual liberation of Czechoslovakia.	3a25X1
		25X1 25X1
Spor	ntaneous Group Activities and Unrest	
9.	In June 1953 at the rail center of Prerov, workers struck from two	0.53.44
	Equipment Plant in Prerov, when all workers went on strike; they did nothing but mill around in the factory yards. The factory militia kept the workers from leaving the premises and demonstrating The factory militia was made up of regular workers who, when needed	
	were alerted and called to quell unrest.	25X

Approved For Release 2009/09/18: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400300009-5

25X1

	Approved For Release 2009/09/18 : CIA-RDP82-00046R000400300009-5	3 <b>/</b> I
	SECRET	
	- 3 -	
-		25X <sup>-</sup>
10.	student demonstrations in Brno in 1946 during the first money reform. Other demonstrations, mainly by students of the Technical University, occurred after 1948. The reason for such demonstrations was that the government had originally intende to build a monument to Jan Masaryk on the main square opposite a finished Soviet memorial, but never got beyond placing the cornerstone of Masaryk's monument. All demonstrating students were	
Reg	ime's Effect on Youth	5X1
12.		
	Communist sympathizers among the youth, mainly because young Czechoslovaks felt that Communism in Czechoslovakia aimed to furth the cause of the USSR rather than any Czechoslovak cause. Anti- Communist feelings were not so much inspired by positive ideals as by the fact that foreigners, not Czechoslovaks, would reap the benefits and profits under the Communist régime.	25X1 .e <b>r</b> 25X
Popu	lar Attitude Toward the Régime	
13.	People were dissatisfied with the low standard of merchandise and were convinced that all merchandise of good quality was exported mainly to the USSR. At times exported goods were returned by the buyer to Czechoslovakia because of minor defects and were then resold on the domestic market. The Czechoslovaks were very anxious to buy these rejected export goods because they knew that the were better than goods normally sold on the domestic market.	
Fina	ncial Support of Resistance Groups	
14.	most partisans were Czechs that originally fled to the West and	25X <sup>2</sup>
	only support they might receive from within the country would be limited to food and minor supplies.	5X1
Tren	d of Communism	
15.	that the Communist Party was losing members.	25X <sup>-</sup>
Resi	stance Potential of the Population	

16.

25X1 95% of the population would side with the West in the event of hostilities. Most members of the SNB were former members of the Czechoslovak rural police and the government could not completely count on them. 25X1 25X1 almost 100% but in Bohemia possibly only 70% would do so.

SECRET

25X1 SECRET - 4 -25X1 in Moravia and Slovakia popular complaints against the régime were common and were openly made in front of the SNB; these complaints consisted of high costs and poor quality of goods. the most dissatisfied group and the first which would join the West would be the farmers. The second group would be the workers. 25X1

Approved For Release 2009/09/18: CIA-RDP82-00046R000400300009-5

## Anti-Semitism

25X1 17. no instances of anti-Semitism in Czechoslovakia.

SECRET